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After more than a decade of intense
discussions between various Muslim
organizations and successive Minis-
ters of Interior, ambassadors, scholars,
experts, etc., a representative board
for the Muslim worship in France was
finally elected in April 2003. Its first
general assembly meeting took place
in Paris on 3 May 2003. Notwithstand-
ing many critics, the Conseil Français
du Culte Musulman (CFCM) c o n s t i-
tutes an elected national body in
charge of issuing ‘principal statements
on central religious topics’1 and embodying the partnership with pub-
lic authorities, nationally and locally. The CFCM is made of a general
assembly and twenty-five regional agencies called the Conseils Ré-
gionaux du Culte Musulman (CRCM) in charge of the daily manage-
ment of the Muslim communities’ affairs, in particular relations with
the French public administration. This step represents a victory in
many ways, although the nature of this victory differs according to the
actors that have been committed to the project since its launching by
Jean-Pierre Chevènement, former Minister of Interior, in the fall of
1 9 9 9 .
Several Cabinets had long tried to provide a solution to the question
of representation of Islam as a worship in the French context. P. Joxe
was the first (in 1989) to try to set up a council of reflection on Islam in
France, followed by Charles Pasqua and the creation of a council of
representation of French Islam and the editing of a charter of the Mus-
lim worship in France. In October 1999, Jean-Pierre Chevènement fol-
lowed up the previous initiatives with a new concept encapsulated in
the label of ‘Consultation sur l’islam de France-Istichara’ with a clear
objective of setting up a board of Muslim representatives in charge of
working as a partner with the state on religious issues. The notion of
‘consultation’ appeared from the very beginning as the main legiti-
mating factor guiding the public project of helping Muslims set up a
representative institution. It started like a fairytale full of promises,
and should have been concluded in May 2002 with the elections of
the CFCM. After many rescheduled polls, resignations, and new ap-
pointments, the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy in the government in June
2002 gave a new impetus and accelerated the process, which turned
out to be somewhat of a ‘forced wedding’ that finally ended as a ‘mar-
riage of convenience’ after the surprising results of the 6 and 13 April
e l e c t i o n s .
The initial step of the ‘Consultation’ had been to list the main questions
and call for concrete and rapid solutions to certain issues: the creation
of denominational organizations as foreseen by title IV of the law of
1905, the creation of new places of worship, and defining the status of
the religious staff. On 3 July 2001, a decisive step was taken with the
setting up of a framework agreement elaborating on the principles
and legal basis that organize the relationship between the public au-
thorities and the Muslim worship. The framework agreement opens
with the declaration of loyalty to the Republican fundamental princi-
ples and more specifically to the constitutional principles of freedom
of conscience. One of the priorities of the Consultation consisted of
identifying the most suitable procedures for the designation of the
representative board (CFCM). Several Muslim representatives laid
down the method for the rapid emergence of an authoritative body for
Islam in France. The choice would be made on the ‘church basis’: the
elections would intervene in the places of worship and buildings ruled
by declared associations. While it was decided to hold elections, the 4
to 5 million Muslims living in France
were not asked to go directly to the
polls in April.2 Instead, they were repre-
sented by 4031 delegates stemming
from 995 places of worship officially
registered as associations, the number
of persons representing each place
being related to the size of the site. The
elected board would then become an
association of the July 1901 law type.
On the one hand, the Consultation
opened real opportunities for dialogue
and raised some important issues for
the CFCM agenda. On the other hand, it only covers part of the prob-
lem and is perceived as a constraint for those associative leaders who
feel they have been excluded from the process. 
Does the CFCM represent the Muslims?
Since its implementation, the Consultation has been gathering dif-
ferent categories of Muslim representatives. One is made of federative
structures such as the Grande Mosquée de Paris (GMP), the Union des
Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF), the Fédération Nationale
des Musulmans de France (FNMF), the Tabligh, the Turkish DITIB – also
known as the Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France
(CCMT), and the Fédération Française des Associations Islamiques
d’Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles (FFAIACA). Large independent
mosques like, among others, the Islamic cultural centre of Evry, al-Islah
mosque in Marseille, or the mosque in Mantes-La-Jolie constitute an-
other category of participants, to which should be added the so-called
‘qualified personalities’, a heterogeneous group of converts, scholars,
and experts. The process did not achieve unanimity among Muslims,
mostly due to its working methods rather than its initial purpose. A lot
of Muslim associative leaders felt ‘obliged’ to participate in order not to
be excluded from important dossiers. Several voices from associative
leaders (whether or not participants in the Consultation) have in par-
ticular very strongly criticized the participation of associations and fed-
erations considered not to be representative of a moderate Islam. This
was particularly the case after Sarkozy who, last June and July, met
with the leaders of UOIF on a bilateral basis. Soheib Benscheikh, main
mufti of Marseille, has been one of the strongest opponents from the
inside – having participated in the Consultation for a while – and from
the outside. Calling the whole process a ‘bureaucratic m e c h o u i a’, he
stressed that the French government should get rid of ‘this post-colo-
nial approach’: ‘The Ministry of Interior even called this Consultation i s-
t i c h a r a, with a publication associated to it whose title is in Arabic! But
we are in France! It seems like one is looking for “local colour”, folk-
l o r e . ’3 The paternalism charges denouncing the ‘neo-colonial’ attitude
of the government towards the Muslim communities at large have
been the most frequent attacks against the entire initiative. The evolu-
tion of this process of institutionalization of Islam had also the ambi-
tion to solve the problem of the role of the states of origin. On different
occasions (questions of the financing of the places of worship, media-
tion of the King of Morocco in the first ‘veiling affair’ in 1989), the co-
administration of Islam both by the French government and by the
states of origin clearly demonstrated the insufficiency of the French
policies in this domain. An affair for domestic policy or for foreign af-
fairs, the issue hardly found a proper space on the French political
agenda. The Consultation itself still remains highly influenced by a
diplomatic management. Indeed, the census forms for the mosques in-
dicating the size and squared metres would have been diffused by the
Algerian consulate on behalf of the Paris mosque, the Moroccan con-
sulates having given their support to certain associations.4
Current Issues
France is the second country in Western
Europe, after Belgium in 1998 (see I S I M
N e w s l e t t e r 2, p. 26), to have elected
a representative Muslim council.
T h e formation of the Conseil Français du Culte
Musulman (CFCM) was carefully controlled by
t h e Ministry of Interior and despite the
substantial support it has received for its
general purpose of consultation, many have
questioned the degree to which the CFCM
truly reflects the composition of
t h e M u s l i m community. 
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ject is, however, not the same from one
context to another depending upon the
national and local political structures:
does it aim at monitoring and regulating
(controlling?) the Muslims? The French
framework of laicity adds even more
complexity: to what extent does the
state go beyond its neutrality in actively
supporting the creation of a representa-
tive body (for example, since June 2002,
its direct intervention as a mediator be-
tween competing structures running for
elections)? 
Now that the CFCM is elected, the cen-
tral question deals with its capacity to
provide the Muslim population living in
France with the right answers to their
multiple questions. In an interview for
the Muslim journal La Medina, Sarkozy
declared shortly after being appointed
that ‘[t]he purpose of the Consultation is
to represent Islam of France, not Islam in
France’,7 based on what he called the ‘re-
ality of the field’, explaining thus the
dominant role of the regional commit-
tees. Until now, these challenges have
been resolved thanks to the state having
delegated to the local authorities the
means and competences for managing
religious issues (e.g. Muslim plots in
cemeteries or the decision to exclude a
veiled student from a public school). The
training of imams will be one of the first
questions to be answered by the newly
elected board. Around 1,000 imams are
working in France, 90 per cent of whom
are foreigners (often with insufficient
levels of French language capacities, un-
clear status, and dependency on foreign countries, notably Algeria, Mo-
rocco, and Turkey): the problem is multi-faceted. It is actually conceived
as involving not only the Ministry of Interior and the CFCM but also as an
issue covered by the Ministry of Education. It seems that the university (in
particular the faculty of Islamic Studies) could be mobilized in shaping
the proper format to be adopted in France, something probably along
the lines of an intermediary between a pure faculty of theology and a re-
ligious seminary.
One week after the second round of the elections, visiting the annual
meeting of the UOIF in Le Bourget, Sarkozy was severely booed when he
stated that women should be bareheaded when
posing for pictures for their national identity cards.
The immediate controversy (in particular activated
by the media) that followed clearly illustrates the
limits of the CFCM both as an institution and as an
authority as far as its regulating capacity is con-
cerned. Moreover, if the French state has demon-
strated a public commitment to treat Islam equally
in comparison with other worships, it seems impos-
sible to solve, in one and the same body, the social
issues raised by the visibility of religious signs in the
public space.8 Jean-Pierre Raffarin, French Prime
Minister, noted in his discourse in front of the first
CFCM General Assembly meeting on 3 May 2003:
‘Religion is coming back and it is good news to me.’
The veil is certainly going to be, again, a hot and
central topic in France for the coming months. But
this time, it will open up a discussion that goes far
beyond the issue of equality of Islam and other
worships and the individual right of a Muslim to be
respected as a citizen.
The elections of the CFCM are certainly the most ‘performative’ aspect
of the whole project. Chevènement conceived it as a Consultation em-
phasizing the participative and deliberative components of the repre-
sentation perspective. The two-round elections have been perceived
as a means of legitimizing the institution. The rate of participation was
approximately 88.5 per cent. Two points should be made in that re-
spect. First of all the diversity of the trends: there is not a single associ-
ation that could be considered as a winner that would dominate exclu-
sively the CFCM. The elections have demonstrated the diversity of
trends within the French associations of Muslims. The explicit loser of
the elections is the Grande Mosquée de Paris, which, despite its repre-
sentation all over France, gathered only 12 per cent of the national
votes. Dalil Boubakeur has, however, been confirmed as president of
the CFCM as he was designated to this position last December after a
meeting of the COMOR. The two winners of these first elections of the
CFCM are the FNMF, with 39 per cent of the votes, and the UOIF, with
27 per cent. Who should sit around the Republic’s table? One central
aspect of the consultative nature and one of the main results of the
elections has been called by certain experts a ‘democratization’ of
I s l a m .5 It illustrates in a way the political skills of the various organiza-
tions, in particular in terms of tactical moves and construction of al-
liances that will probably appear as soon as the CRCM are officially or-
ganized and identified. Will then the CFCM and the CRCM be able to
work jointly and efficiently? 
A French touch?
In France, the principle of laicity is based mainly on a denominational
definition of religion, meaning that religions exist for the French state
through their religious institutions.6 In many respects, the French institu-
tionalization process of a representative structure is very much similar to
what occurs elsewhere in the European Union in terms of public policies
dealing with the recognition of Islam as a worship. Muslims are almost
everywhere systematically disqualified for their incapacity to provide the
state with a unique and unified speaker, preventing thus its institutional-
ization, its ‘churchification’. The meaning of this institutionalization pro-
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